Remote-Access Investment Scams: Bahrain’s Court of Cassation Tightens Liability for Electronic Fraud Facilitators (Cassation Appeal No. 166 of 2024)

5 min 17 sec May 14, 2026 (Edited) الترجمة العربية

Written by

Khalid Al Hamrani

Partner, Head of Criminal Litigation and White-Collar Crime

k.hamrani@tamimi.com View LinkedIn Profile

Noor Al Rayes

Partner, Head of Litigation - Bahrain

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Fatema Sarhan

Senior Associate

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Recent regional developments and the heightened risk environment have prompted regulators and market institutions in Bahrain to renew public warnings regarding fraudulent communications impersonating official entities, financial institutions, and investment platforms. These warnings underscore the increasing prevalence of sophisticated electronic fraud schemes that exploit uncertainty and rely on technology-enabled deception.

Electronic fraud has moved well beyond isolated or one-off scams. Increasingly, it is organised, role-based, and technology-enabled — combining social engineering techniques with tools that provide perpetrators with remote visibility and control over a victim’s device.

Bahrain’s courts are correspondingly seeing more cases involving complex fraud networks in which the individual contacting the victim is not necessarily the person who ultimately receives the funds or collects the proceeds. Instead, such schemes frequently rely on intermediaries, couriers, and account holders to create distance between the fraudulent conduct and the resulting proceeds.

Against this backdrop, the Bahrain Court of Cassation’s judgment in Cassation Appeal No. 166 of 2024 provides important guidance on how Bahraini courts assess liability in organised electronic-fraud schemes. In particular, the decision illustrates:

• how courts analyse the misuse of electronic authentication mechanisms;
• how courts assess coordinated fraudulent conduct across multiple actors; and
• the evidentiary foundations required to establish participation and intent in cyber-enabled financial crime.

This article provides a general legal commentary derived from the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation.

The scheme: Investment pretext, remote access, and fund extraction

 The conduct addressed by the Court reflects a recurring fraud typology increasingly observed across the region. Victims are contacted by individuals impersonating representatives of an investment firm and are promised lucrative returns through investments in commodities or other assets.

After establishing initial trust and securing early transfers, victims are instructed to install remote-access applications on their mobile devices. Once installed, these applications allow perpetrators to view the victim’s screen in real time and obtain one-time passwords (OTP) or verification codes used to authenticate digital banking transactions. With access to these credentials, perpetrators can initiate unauthorised transfers through online or mobile banking channels.

The Court emphasised that criminality in such schemes extends beyond a single misleading statement. Instead, the conduct constitutes a structured fraud architecture in which technological tools form the operational layer through which the fraud is executed.

Statutory framework engaged

 The Court’s reasoning reflects the combined application of several legislative provisions within Bahrain’s legal framework:

• , including liability arising from agreement or assistance in the commission of an offence;
• the Electronic Transactions Law (Decree-Law No. 54 of 2018), which protects the integrity and reliability of electronic signatures and authentication mechanisms; and
• the Cybercrime Law (Law No. 60 of 2014), which criminalises the misuse of information technology for the purpose of unlawfully obtaining property or financial benefits.

 Elements of the offence

 Material element

The Court considered the material element of the offence to consist of a series of fraudulent acts carried out using technological means in order to obtain victims’ funds. Relevant acts included: impersonation and inducement of victims to transfer funds; instructing victims to install software; acquiring and using authentication codes or verification credentials; and executing unauthorised transfers or withdrawals, sometimes followed by coordinated cash collection.

The Court adopted a practical interpretation of the misuse of electronic signatures and authentication mechanisms. Where authentication codes or credentials are used to validate electronic transactions without the authority of the account holder, such misuse forms a core part of the criminal mechanism.

 Mental element

The Court reaffirmed that intent and knowledge may be inferred from surrounding circumstances rather than requiring explicit admission.

In cyber-enabled fraud schemes, intent is often established through patterns of conduct, including repeated receipt of funds, communications relating to financial transfers, and the operational role played by the accused within the scheme.

Where an individual participates at a later stage of the scheme — such as receiving or collecting funds rather than directly contacting victims — the key question becomes whether that individual knew, or could not reasonably have been unaware, that the funds represented proceeds of unlawful activity and that their actions facilitated the scheme.

 Participation in organised electronic fraud

 A notable aspect of the decision lies in the Court’s treatment of criminal participation, particularly in cases where fraud networks distribute roles across multiple actors.

Participation by agreement

 The Court confirmed that coordinated criminal intent may be inferred from the structure and execution of the scheme, even in the absence of direct evidence of an express agreement. Organised fraud networks rarely leave documentary evidence of their arrangements; courts therefore examine the alignment of actions and roles within the overall operation.

Participation by assistance

The Court also emphasised that liability may arise where an individual provides meaningful assistance to the scheme. This may include receiving substantial funds linked to the fraud, coordinating cash handovers, or performing operational tasks that help convert or transfer proceeds. This aspect of the judgment serves as an important reminder that liability may extend to intermediaries who facilitate the movement or handling of proceeds, even where they have had no direct contact with victims.

In this context, the Court reaffirmed that challenges seeking to recharacterise the conduct as a lesser offence will not succeed where they merely dispute the factual findings adopted by the trial court, as the assessment of the facts remains within the discretion of the court of merits.

Where multiple offences arise from the same conduct and are inseparably connected — including both a felony and a misdemeanour — the competent court is that which has jurisdiction over the more serious offence. In organised electronic–fraud schemes, this principle enables prosecutors to pursue composite charges involving misuse of electronic authentication tools, cybercrime offences, and fraud-related conduct before the criminal court competent to hear the gravest charge.

Evidentiary architecture in cyber fraud cases

 The Court of Cassation’s decision illustrates the evidentiary framework commonly relied upon in cyber-enabled financial crime prosecutions. Courts typically assess a combination of evidence, including:

• victim accounts describing the inducement, transfers, and installation of remote-access software;
• investigative findings from specialised cybercrime or economic crime units;
• digital forensic analysis, such as the extraction of messages, transaction references, and communications with external numbers; and
• financial records demonstrating the receipt, transfer, or layering of funds across multiple accounts.

The Court recognised that these forms of evidence may reinforce one another and, when device data, financial transaction trails, and victim narratives align, the overall evidentiary picture may be considered sufficiently coherent to establish participation in the scheme.