Expanding the Scope of Compensation for Moral Damage under the New Civil Transactions Law – Recent UAE Judgments

8 min 0 sec April 23, 2026 (Edited) الترجمة العربية

Written by

Mohamed Al Marzouqi

Partner,
Head of Office – Abu Dhabi,
Co Head of Dispute Resolution

m.almarzouqi@tamimi.com

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Dr. Omar Al Azawe

Of Counsel

o.alazawe@tamimi.com

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Across legal systems, both legislation and judicial practice have consistently recognised that compensation should extend to the family, loved ones, and close relatives of an injured party, with a view to alleviating the pain and suffering occasioned to them by bodily harm to a victim or by the victim’s death in an accident. This category of damage is encompassed within the concept of moral damages.

The Former Civil Transactions Law No. 5 of 1985 (the “Former Law”) expressly regulated certain aspects of compensation for this type of damage in favour of spouses and close relatives, while leaving others unaddressed — giving rise to inconsistent application of the relevant statutory provisions. Article 293(2) of the Former Law provided as follows:

“Compensation may be awarded to spouses and close relatives for the moral damage they suffer by reason of the death of the injured party.”

Under this provision, the right of spouses and relatives to claim reflected moral damage was limited to a single circumstance: where the victim’s bodily injury resulted in the victim’s death. If, on the other hand, the injury resulted in physical disfigurement or disability, and a relative of the victim suffered moral damage in consequence, that relative had no standing to claim — the express language of the Former Law precluded it. The result was a judicial split between the courts, as examined below.

The Judicial Divergence under the Former Law

The Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation

The Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation — endorsed on this point by the Federal Supreme Court — held that Article 293(2) of the Former Law was not capable of founding an award of compensation for non-fatal bodily injuries. In one of its judgments, the Court stated:

“This Court has consistently held that the legislature, having recognised the principle of compensation for moral damage, identified the persons entitled to claim it: the injured party, and those who suffer moral harm by reason of the death of the injured party — being spouses and relatives. Accordingly, where the injured party survives, such persons have no entitlement to compensation for moral damage arising from his injuries.”(Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation — Cassation Nos. 113 and 114 of 2016, judgment of 19 February 2017; Federal Supreme Court, Cassation Nos. 134, 137, and 138 of Judicial Year 20 [Civil])

The Dubai Court of Cassation

The Dubai Court of Cassation took a divergent view. In a settled line of authority, it admitted claims by the spouses and family relatives of an injured party for moral damages arising from the victim’s non-fatal bodily injuries. The Court reasoned that Article 293 of the Former Law was concerned solely with identifying who could claim compensation for moral damage in the event of the victim’s death — namely, spouses and relatives — and was silent on all other circumstances. The provision did not define the basis of the claim as being confined to death; its object was to designate the eligible claimants where death occurred, consistently with the general principle that compensation must cover all damage actually sustained.

The Court accordingly held that a relative was entitled to compensation for the suffering caused by the victim’s injury, whether fatal or non-fatal. In a notable judgment, the Dubai Court of Cassation stated:

“The legislature authorised compensation for moral damage in general terms, without restriction, then confined this right — so far as concerns the identity of eligible claimants — to spouses and close relatives in the event of death. This amounts to a designation of the persons entitled to moral damage, not a delimitation of the circumstances or causes giving rise to that entitlement. The same reasoning applies, a fortiori, to identifying those entitled to compensation for moral damage where the injury does not result in death. It is further established that where a person sustains bodily injuries, it follows as a matter of logical necessity that moral harm is suffered both by that person and by the members of his family. The assessment of compensation in such cases falls within the discretion of the trial court.”(Dubai Court of Cassation — Cassation No. 307 of 2014, judgment of 8 January 2015)

The approach of the Dubai Court of Cassation was directed at broadening the class of persons entitled to compensation in respect of a victim’s bodily injuries. Those close to a victim will continue to witness him living with paralysis or a grievous physical disability — a source of enduring distress — even if they are not formally designated as spouses or relatives within a defined degree. The death of a loved one is undoubtedly painful; yet it may occasion less suffering than the prolonged sight of a person afflicted with a permanent infirmity, where the anguish is renewed with every encounter.

Compelling as these justifications may be for broadening the scope of application in the interests of eligible claimants, the fact remains that, from a legislative standpoint, the statutory text stood in need of amendment so as to bring the law into conformity with judicial practice and to achieve uniformity of application across all courts, both federal and local. This is a reform that had been advocated on several occasions in academic articles and legal research.

The Legislative Reform: Article 254(2) of the New Civil Transactions Law No. 25 of 2025

The legislature ultimately intervened through Civil Transactions Law No. 25 of 2025 (the “New Law”), amending the statutory language — and adopting the very formulation previously proposed in academic writing — so as to extend compensation for moral damage to both cases: the disability and the death of the injured party.

Article 254(2) of the New Law provides as follows:

“Compensation may be awarded to spouses and close relatives up to the second degree of kinship for the moral damage they suffer by reason of the disability or death of the injured party.”

The legislature has expressly specified the requisite degree of kinship as the second degree, encompassing by way of example: father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, grandfather, grandmother, and grandchildren. The persons entitled to claim this category of compensation are accordingly as follows:

Spouses: the husband or wife (or wives, where there is more than one) are entitled to claim compensation for moral damage arising from the death or disability of their spouse.
Family relatives up to the second degree of kinship: Article 76 of the Civil Transactions Law provides that a person’s family comprises his kin, and that kin are deemed to be all persons who share a common ancestor. The degree of kinship of a person who may have suffered moral damage as a result of the death or disability of the injured party is therefore no longer a matter of judicial discretion; it is fixed by statute.

The concept of kinship and the method of calculating degrees of kinship are governed by Articles 77, 78, and 79 of the New Law. In summary, kinship encompasses lineal kinship (for example, between parent and child) and collateral kinship (for example, between siblings). Kinship by affinity, kinship by fosterage, and analogous relationships fall outside the scope of Article 254(2), as persons in those categories do not share a common ancestor within the meaning of Article 76.

Consequences of the Amendment

The application of the amendments introduced by Article 254(2) of the New Law produces two principal practical outcomes.

Limitation by Degree of Kinship

Courts will refuse any claim for compensation for moral damage arising from the death or disability of the injured party where the claimant’s degree of kinship exceeds the second degree. This limitation is drawn from a number of comparable Arab civil law enactments, including Article 222(2) of the Egyptian Civil Code, Article 231(2) of the Kuwaiti Civil Code, and Article 202(2) of the Qatari Civil Code. Other jurisdictions, by contrast, do not prescribe any degree of kinship, including Article 267(2) of the Jordanian Civil Code and Article 205(2) of the Iraqi Civil Code.

While this limitation offers ease of application, it risks curtailing the court’s discretion in the pursuit of justice. Cases will inevitably arise in which a relative of the third or fourth degree, though remote in formal kinship, is in reality closely connected to the victim by reason of particular circumstances — illness, travel, or domestic situation — such that the accident occasioning injury or death to the victim causes that person genuine moral harm. It is therefore preferable either to leave the provision without specifying a degree of kinship, as under the Former Law, or to fix the second degree as the default while granting the court a discretionary power to depart from that limit in exceptional cases, where it is satisfied that the circumstances and facts of the case before it so warrant.

Extension to Disability

Eligible claimants under Article 254(2) are now entitled to claim compensation for moral damage by reason of the victim’s disability. The provision does not, however, specify a particular degree of disability — whether total or partial — nor does it clarify whether the disability must be temporary or permanent. These matters accordingly fall to be assessed by the court in its discretion, having regard to the circumstances of each case.

Conclusion

The legislative reform introduced by Article 254(2) of the New Law represents a significant and long-overdue step in the development of UAE civil liability law. By extending the right to claim reflected moral damage to cases of disability — and not merely death — the legislature has aligned the statutory framework with the more progressive and equitable approach that the Dubai Court of Cassation had already adopted as a matter of judicial practice, and has resolved the inconsistency that had previously prevailed between the courts.

Taken together, the reform introduced by the New Law offer a clearer and more coherent framework for the assessment and award of compensation for moral damage arising from bodily injury in the UAE — one that better serves the overriding objectives of justice, consistency, and full reparation for harm suffered.